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Abstract
Centipede Games represent a classic puzzle in game theory. In this work, we employ
p-beliefs to show that almost any behavior is consistent with rationality and almost
Common Belief in Rationality. However, Common p-Belief in Rationality cannot justify
why people cooperate in some Centipede Games but not others in a non-trivial way.
We thus propose a novel theoretical framework that links the p-beliefs in rationality to
the incentives to cooperate. This more general subjective belief-based approach serves
as a predictor of cooperation. We show that the proposed approach organizes well the
behavior in an experiment with a large variety of Centipede Games.
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1 Introduction
The Centipede Game (CG, henceforth), proposed by Rosenthal (1981), represents a classic
puzzle in game theory. In such game, two players choose alternately between two possible
actions, Pass or Take, for a known number of rounds. If any player plays Take, the game
ends. CGs are characterized by a particular payo↵ structure: each player’s payo↵ from
playing Take in a decision node is (i) lower than the payo↵ she gets if she plays Take
in any later decision node, but (ii) higher than when she plays Pass and her opponent
plays Take.1 Rationality and Common (strong) Belief in Rationality (RCBR, henceforward)
implies that the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE, hereafter) is Take at every
decision node, resulting in a unique prediction: the game is over at the very first decision
node.2 However, people frequently play Pass initially in CGs, a behavior that stands in
stark contrast with the theoretical prediction (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Rapoport,
Stein, Parco and Nicholas, 2003; Bornstein, Kugler and Ziegelmeyer, 2004). Due to the
payo↵ structure, which simultaneously incentivizes passing and taking before the opponent
does, a conflict between payo↵ maximization and sequential reasoning arises. This classical
tension is also reflected in other strategic situations, such as the classic repeated Prisoner’s
dilemma (see Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2011; Friedman and Oprea, 2012; Bigoni, Casari,
Skrzypacz and Spagnolo, 2015; Embrey, Fre´chette and Yuksel, 2018 for recent research),
industry oligopolies or public good provisions. So it is important to understand how people
behave when facing this type of situations.
In this paper, we first show theoretically that the standard prediction of behavior in CGs
is extremely non-robust to relaxations of Common (strong) Belief in Rationality (CBR,
hereafter). To this aim, we introduce the notion of p-rationalizability allowing players
to entail uncertainty about higher-order mutual rationality. The result establishes that
cooperation in CGs is justified for any p < 1 that is, no matter how negligible the uncertainty
about higher-order rationality is.
However, this result is insensitive on the payo↵ structure as long as the game is a
CG, while it has been documented that subjects’ behavior di↵ers systematically across
di↵erent CGs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2012; Garcia-
Pola, Iriberri and Kova´rˇ´ık, 2020). Our second contribution is to propose a subjective belief-
based approach that can organize the behavior across both subjects and CGs with di↵erent
payo↵ structures. To this aim, we combine two concepts: players’ subjective beliefs about
opponent’s behavior and Threshold Conjectures that reflect the incentives to Take or Pass
1Section 2.1.2 formally characterizes the Centipede Game and Figure 1 displays an example of a general
CG.
2Rationality and common strong belief in rationality is the natural counterpart of rationality and common
belief in rationality for dynamic games, see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003).
3in a particular CG. In particular, Threshold Conjectures correspond to subjective beliefs
regarding opponents’ behavior that induce indi↵erences between all the possible strategies
at every decision node. Our methodology predicts that the higher the Threshold Belief is,
the higher observed rates of cooperation should be, at a particular decision node.
Using lab data from an experiment with a large variety of CGs , we corroborate this
positive relationship between Threshold Beliefs and the degrees of cooperation estimating
correlations and some logit models. We find that the Threshold Conjectures explain well the
behavior in experimental data at both the population and the individual level. Specially,
for 60.56% of the subjects the Threshold Conjectures explain significantly the observed
behavior across their 16 decisions in the 16 variations of the CG.
We contribute to two streams of literature. Related to epistemic game theory we intro-
duce the strong p-belief operator, which building on Monderer and Samet’s (1987) notion
of p-belief generalizes Battigalli and Siniscalchi’s (2003) strong belief, by requiring that an
event is believed with probability at least p (instead of 1) at every unexpected history the
event is consistent with (instead at every history the event is consistent with). The above
allows for a more purely game-theoretic contribution consisting on the introduction of a new
solution concept for dynamic games, (extensive-form) p-rationalizability, which generalizes
extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984 and Battigalli, 1997). p-Rationalizability cap-
tures the behavioral implications of rationality and common strong p-belief in rationality
and hence, it allows for representing arbitrarily small departures from the benchmark of
perfect rationality in dynamic games. When p = 1, p-rationalizability and extensive-form
rationalizability coincide, and when the game is static, our solution concept coincides with
Hu’s 2007 notion of p-rationalizability for static games. Applying p-rationalizability we
show the extreme non-robustness of the standard prediction, as presented above.
We contribute to the literature which study the mismatch between the observed and the
predicted behavior in the CG by introducing a novel approach. This approach is able to
explain the di↵erences in the observed behavior at both the population and the individual
level based on the strong p-belief operator. We can classify the explanations that state why
observed behavior di↵ers from the unique SPNE in the CG in broadly three categories.
Models of bounded rationality, that assumes that individuals are not completely rational
(see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; McKelvey and Palfrey,
1998), preference-based models, which lean on the assumption that players do not maximizes
only their own payo↵ (e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Garcia-Pola, Iriberri and Kova´rˇ´ık,
2020) and models that relax the notion of CBR. A Bayesian equilibrium approach (see
McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) and level-k thinking model (see Kawagoe and Takizawa,2012;
Ho and Su, 2013 for recent research) were proposed to relax this assumption. Although
there is a wide variety of literature that analyse why the players di↵er from the SPNE
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prediction, in this paper, we focus on the relaxation of the CBR allowing players to suspect
about the opponents’ rationality.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework and
presents our theoretical result apart from proposing the methodology used. Section 3
presents the data we use and the results that support our belief-based approach. Section
4 concludes and presents future research derived from our study. Additionally, Appendices
A to E incorporate all the auxiliary material.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section introduces the theoretical framework. First, we formally present dynamic
games as well as the concrete framework of the CGs. Then, we recall the concepts of
p-belief and p-Rationalizability and extend them to extensive-form dynamic games.
2.1 Preliminaries
We describe first the general framework for a dynamic game and characterize the terms of
conjecture and sequential rationality. Then, we formally define the CGs.
2.1.1 Dynamic Games
A dynamic game (with complete information) consists of a list   = hI, (Ai)i2I , H, Z, (ui)i2Ii
where I is the finite set of players and:
• For each player i, Ai is a finite set of actions. A history represents the unfolding of
the game and consists of finite sequence of possibly simultaneous choices, i.e. on a
finite sequence of elements from {;} [SJ✓I AJ , where AJ :=Qi2J Ai for any J ✓ I.
We say that history h0 follows history h, denoted by h   h0, if h0 obtains from adding
finitely many possibly simultaneous choices to h.3
• H and Z are finite and disjoint sets of histories such that (H [ Z, ) is a rooted and
oriented tree with terminal nodes Z. Symbol ; denotes the ex ante stage of the game
(i.e., the root of the tree) and histories in H and Z are referred to as partial and
terminal, respectively. For any player i and partial history h, let Ai (h) denote the
set of actions available to i at h. Player i is active at h if Ai(h) is nonempty; let
Hi denote the set of these histories. We assume that: (i) a player is never the only
active one twice in a row, and (ii) whenever a player is active, at least two actions
are available to her.
3That is, when there exists some (an)nN ✓ A such that h0 = (h; (an)nN ).
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In this context, the set of player i’s strategies is Si :=
Q
h2Hi Ai(h) and, as usual, the set of
strategy profiles is denoted by S :=
Q
i2I Si and the set of player i’s opponents strategies,
by S i :=
Q
j 6=i Sj . Obviously, for each partial history h, each strategy s induces a unique
terminal history z(s|h). Let Si(h) and S i(h) denote, respectively, the sets of player i and
i’s opponents strategies that reach partial history h, and Hi(si), the set of player i’s histo-
ries that can be reached when she chooses strategy si.4 Finally, for each terminal history
Z and for each player i, the payo↵ function is defined as ui : Z ! R.
Conjectures
A conjecture for player i formalizes player’s beliefs about other players’ behavior as the
game unfolds. Formally, for each player i, it consists of a conditional probability system
µi = (µi(h))h2Hi[{;} such that: (i) for every history h, either initial or in which player i is
active, µi(h) is a probability measure on S i(h) that assigns probability 1 to S i(h), and
(ii) whenever possible, beliefs are updated following conditional probability. We say that
history h 6= ; is unexpected for conjecture µi if µi(h0) assigns null probability to reaching h
at every history h0 preceding h.5
Sequential rationality
Each strategy si and conjecture µi naturally induce a conditional expected payo↵ at each
history h 2 Hi [ {;}:
Ui (µi, si |h) :=
X
s i2S i
µi(h)[s i] · ui (z (s i; si |h)) .
A player is said to be sequentially rational when her strategy maximizes her conditional
expected payo↵ at every history that it reaches. This is captured when player i chooses a
strategy which is in the set of best-replies for conjecture µi, formally defined as:6
ri (µi) :=
8<:si 2 Si
      si 2
\
h2Hi(si)
argmax
s0i2Si
Ui
 
µi, s
0
i |h
 9=; .
4To be precise, Si(h) = {si 2 Si|h   z(s i; si|;) for some s i 2 S i} and S i(h) = Qj 6=i Sj(h) on the
one hand, and Hi(si) := {h 2 Hi|si 2 Si(h)} on the other.
5That is, if µi(h)[S i(h0)] = 0 for every h0   h.
6Notice that, if we denote the set of all conjecture of player i as  Hi[{;}(S i), then ri :  Hi[{;}(S i)◆
Si is upper-hemicontinuous.
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2.1.2 Centipede Games
In our analysis, we slightly simplify the notation above to taylor it to the specific structure
of CGs.7 The CG is a two-player extensive-form game with perfect information where
players choose between their available actions alternately. Figure 1 displays an example of
a generic version of such game. Formally, for a fixed integer n   2 we represent a CG of
depth n as a list  n := hA,H,Z, (ui)i=1,2i, where:
• A := {r, d} is the set of actions available to each player at each of her turns: r (right)
and d (down).8
• H := {(i, 1), . . . , (i, n)} is the set of partial histories, so that for each player i and each
k  n, (i, k) is the kth decision node of player i. In consequence, the histories in which
player 1 is active are H1 := {(i, k)|k = 1, . . . , n}. Similarly, player 2’s set of histories
is H2 := {(1, 1)} [ {(2, k)|k = 1, ..., n} with (1, 1) being included as well to represent
the fact that player 2 has beliefs about the game before any choice has been made.
• Z := {(h, d)|h 2 H} [ {(2, n, r)} is the set of terminal histories, so that each (h, d)
denotes the terminal history in which partial history h = (i, k) has been reached and
player i has played d, and (2, n, r) denotes the terminal history in which both players
have always chosen r.
• (ui)i2I has the following particular structure. First, at every history of hers, a player
prefers: (i) playing down at a later node of herself than at the present one, and (ii)
playing down immediately than playing right and see her opponent play down. Let
denote ui(j, k, a) as the payo↵ for player i when the action a is played by player j at
her decision node k. Formally, for each k = 1 . . . , n  1 we have:9
u1(1, k + 1, d) > u1(1, k, d) > u1(2, k, d),
u2(2, k + 1, d) > u2(2, k, d) > u2(1, k + 1, d).
The above expressions characterize the tension inherent to CGs. On one hand, each
player has incentive to proceed onward in the game, because of the payo↵ derived
from choose d in her following decision node, k+1, is higher than in the current one,
k. For example for player 1, it is reflected in u1(1, k + 1, d) > u1(1, k, d). On the
7Nevertheless, we maintain the previous general definitions to preserve the generality of the methodology
in Section 2.2.
8In this section, we refer to these available actions as right and down, instead of Pass and Take, because
they represent what we observe graphically.
9Typically it is also assumed that u2(2, 1, d) > u2(1, 1, d); while potentially relevant for lab implementa-
tion, it is strategically irrelevant.
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Figure 1: A Centipede Game of depth n
other hand, each player is better o↵ if she chooses d before her opponent does. Again,
for player 1 it is reflected in u1(1, k, d) > u1(2, k, d). Finally, players have opposite
preferences regarding the last and second to last terminal histories:
u1(2, n, r) > u1(2, n, d) and u2(2, n, d) > u2(2, n, r).
For convenience, we will make use of reduced strategies, so that the set of strategies of
each player i can be conceived as:
Si := {si(k)|k = 1, . . . , n,1} ,
where, for every k  n, si(k) consists of the strategy in which player i plays r until history
(i, k), where d is played instead, and si(1) consists of the strategy in which player i plays
r at every history of hers. Reduced strategies to analyse the CG were firstly used by Nagel
and Tang (1998), but are commonly applied in the current literature.
2.2 p-Rationalizability
A player is rational in a game if she chooses a strategy that maximizes the expected util-
ity given a probabilistic belief over the opponents’ behavior. The epistemic assumptions
of RCBR – that is, everybody is rational, everybody (strongly) believes that everyone is
rational, and so on – allows us to introduce the solution concept of (extensive-form) Ratio-
nalizability (Pearce, 1984 and Battigalli, 1997). We can relax the assumption of CBR by
allowing players to entertain some suspicion that their opponents: (1) may not be rational
(in any arbitrary sense), or (2) may suspect that their opponents are not rational, or (3)
may suspect that their opponents suspect that their opponents are not rational, and so on.
We formalize this idea of suspicion via Monderer and Samet’s (1987) p-belief, which relaxes
the notion of certainty by requiring that an event is believed with “at least probability p”
(for some exogenously given p) instead of “with probability 1” as in case of rationality.
Under the mentioned relaxation of belief, we introduce a solution concept that gener-
alizes Battigalli’s (1997) formalization of Pearce’s (1984) (extensive-form) rationalizability.
We consider Strong p-belief, which is a relaxation of p-belief to dynamic settings. For each
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p 2 [0, 1], we say that an event E i ✓ S i is strongly p-believed by conjecture µi if two
conditions hold. First, µi initially puts probability at least p on E i. Second, at every
unexpected history h that might be reached by some strategy in E i, conjecture µi puts
probability at least p on E i.10 The p-belief constraint is not imposed on every history
consistent with E i, but instead, among those consistent with E i, only on those that were
assigned null probability at every preceding history. This allows for µi assigning very low
probability to E i at some history E i is consistent with, but which was considered unlikely
to be reached—yet not. Formally we get:
Definition 1 (Strong p-belief). Let   be a dynamic game. Then, for every p 2 [0, 1], every
player i, every conjecture µi and every event E i ✓ S i we say that µi strongly p-believes
in E i if µi(h)[E i]   p for every history h of either the following kind:
(i) h = ;.
(ii) h is unexpected for µi and is reached by B i.
Given this extension of p-belief, it is immediate to define the solution concept our analysis
will rely on. This consists of an iterated elimination procedure that follows a very simple
logic: for a fixed p 2 [0, 1], in the first round we eliminate all strategies that are not a
best-reply to some conjecture, in the second round we eliminate all strategies that are not
a best-reply to some conjecture that strongly p-believes in the strategies of the opponents’
that survived the first round, in the third round we eliminate all strategies that are not a
best-reply to some conjecture that strongly p-believes in the strategies of the opponents’
that survived the second round, and so on.11 We can formally define, then, the solution
concept in the following manner:
Definition 2 (p-Rationalizability). Let p 2 [0, 1]. The set of p-rationalizable strategies of
player i is defined as an iterated elimination process by setting Rpi :=
T
k 0R
p
i,k, where:
Rpi,0 := Si,
Rpi,k :=
n
si 2 Rpi,k 1
   si is a best-reply for some µi that p-believes in Rp i,k 1o ,
for every k 2 N.
10Remember that, in Section 2.1.1, we define that a history h 6= ; is unexpected for a conjecture, if, at
every history that precedes, the conjecture assigns null probability to reaching h.
11Or, in other words, a player is rational, she strongly p-believes that her opponents are rational, she
strongly p-believes that her opponents strongly p-believes that their opponents are rational, and so on.
Technically, this assertion requires an epistemic characterization result, but this would follow from standard
(yet tedious) arguments.
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Remark 1. Obviously, both notions monotonically become more stringent as p increases
and, for p = 1, both converge to strong belief (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) and
(extensive-form) rationalizability, respectively. Clearly, in static settings Definition 2 coin-
cides with Hu’s (2007) p-rationalizability.
After providing the theoretical result emanated from the general theoretical framework,
Proposition 1 shows the above result applied to the CG.
Proposition 1. Let  n be a Centipede Game of depth n. Then, there exists some p¯ 2 (0, 1)
such that:
Rp1 :=
8>><>>:
{s1(1)} if p = 1,
S1 \ {s1(1)} if p 2 (p¯, 1),
S1 if p 2 [0, p¯],
Rp2 :=
(
{s2(1)} if p = 1,
S2 \ {s2(1)} if p 2 [0, 1).
Proof. Given the payo↵ structure of CG, the only strategy that is not sequentially rational
in this game is s2(1). Hence we know that Rp1,1 = S1 and Rp2,1 = S2 \ {s2(1)} for every
p 2 [0, 1]. We proceed now in two steps:
Preliminary observation. There exists some p¯ 2 (0, 1) such that s1(1) 2 Rp2,1 for every
p  p¯. Consider conjecture µ01 that assigns probability 1 to s2(1) at every history of player
1’s. Clearly, s1(1) is its unique sequential best reply and, furthermore, it is its unique
conditional strict best reply at every history of player 1. Take arbitrary p 2 (0, 1) and
define conjecture µp1 as follows:
µp1(h) :=
(
p · 1{s2(1)} + (1  p) · µ01(h) if h = (1, 1),
µ01(h) otherwise.
Clearly, µp1 is a well-defined conjecture. Since s1(1) is a unique conditional best reply at
every history of player 1, there exists some p¯ > 0 such that s1(1) is a sequential best reply
to µp1 for every p  p¯. Thus, since Rp2,1 = S2 \ {s2(1)} for every p  p¯, µp1 justifies the
inclusion of s1(1) in W p1,2. The fact that we know that s1(1) /2 R11,2 lets us conclude that
p¯ 2 (0, 1). F
Proof of the proposition. Fix arbitrary p 2 [0, 1). The fact that Rp1,1 = S1 implies
that Rp2,2 = R
p
2,1. We know then that:
Rp1,2 :=
(
S1 \ {s1(1)} if p 2 (p¯, 1),
S1 if p 2 [0, p¯],
Rp2,2 = S2 \ {s2(1)}.
We proceed now by induction: Suppose that the same equalities hold for some m   2.
We will show that they also to for m + 1. For player 1 it is immediate: the fact that
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Rp2,m = R
p
2,m 1 implies that R
p
m+1 = R
p
m. For player 2, the claim is trivially true of
R1,m = S1. Otherwise, for each k = 1, . . . , n construct conjecture µ
p
2 as follows:
µp,k2 (h) :=
(
p · 1{s1(k)} + (1  p) · 1{s1(1)} if h = (2, k0) with k0 < k,
1{s1(1)} otherwise.
Obviously µp,k2 is a conjecture that justifies the inclusion of s2(k) in R
p
2,m+1 and hence the
proof is complete. ⌅
From Proposition 1, it follows that cooperation in CG is justified even by an epsilon
doubt about the belief in rationality of the opponent. In fact, almost any behavior is p-
rationalizable under the minimum suspicion. Moreover, Pass Always is also p-rationalizable
for player 1 under a larger degree of doubt (p  p¯). Actually, p¯ is the probability that
allows for player 1 being indi↵erent between playing Pass or Take in her last decision node.
Obviously, under no suspicion, that is with p = 1, the only p-rationalizable strategy for both
players is choose Take in their first node, as under the notion of rationalizability. Hence, we
detect one element of the theoretical prediction that is extremely non-robust even to a tiny
relaxation: an arbitrarily small uncertainty regarding the opponents’ rationality rationalizes
any degree of cooperation.
Second, player 2’s behavior is trivially identified as it does not depend of p¯ (except for
the extreme case of p=1). Thus, we cannot use the data from player 2 for the identification
purpose. This observation is in line with the one presented by Brandenburger, Danieli and
Friedenberg (2019).
Note that Poposition 1 has an important limitation: p-rationalizability cannot discrim-
inate behavior across di↵erent subjects and/or di↵erent CGs. We target this issue in the
following section.
2.3 Threshold Conjectures
Proposition 1 shows that Common p-Belief in Rationality rationalizes any strategy except
si(1) for both players for any p < 1, and even legitimizes s1(1) for p  p¯. Therefore, p-
rationalizability does not allow to explain behavioral di↵erences across subjects and across
di↵erent variations of CGs. In this section, we propose a novel belief-based approach to
overcome this issue. Our methodology allows us to explain di↵erent behavior across subjects
and/or games on basis of di↵erences in subjective beliefs about opponents’ rationality and
di↵ering incentives to play Take or Pass across di↵erent CGs.
Let m denote the decision node perspective, m 2 {1, . . . , n, }, and k label the decision
node of the opponent in which she plays Take, k 2 {m,m+1, . . . , n,1}. Then, we define the
subjective (updated) belief µm1 (k) := µ1(m)[s2(k)] as the belief of player 1 in decision node
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m that the opponent plays s2(k). Consequently, we can define µm1 := (µ
m
1 (k))k=m,m+1,...,n,1
as the player 1’s conjecture, at node m. We call subjective updated conjectures the belief
formed in later nodes, i.e. when m > 1. For instance, consider a CG with n = 3. A generic
conjecture of player 1 is denoted by µ11 =
 
µ11(1), µ
1
1(2), µ
1
1(3), µ
1
1(1)
 
, where µ11(1) repre-
sents the probability with which player 1 believes that her opponent chooses s2(1). A generic
updated conjecture from the perspective of node 2 is denoted by µ21 =
 
µ21(2), µ
2
1(3), µ
2
1(1)
 
and, finally, the subjective updated conjecture at node 3 as µ31 =
 
µ31(3), µ
3
1(1)
 
. It is im-
portant to note that the subjective conjectures are not objective, material elements, but
rather, subjective personal assessments of uncertainty of each individual. Importantly, in-
dividual di↵erences in the subjective beliefs can explain why some players cooperate but
not others in the same CG.
For each CG at each decision node of player 1, H1, we obtain the (Updated) Threshold
Beliefs (µ¯m1 (k))k=m,...,n,1, from node m perspective, that make player 1 indi↵erent between
s1(k) and s1(k+1) , whenever possible beliefs are updated following conditional probability.
Thanks to the full support of the (Updated) Threshold Beliefs, we can also define the
(Updated) Threshold Conjecture of a game, µ¯m1 := (µ¯
m
1 (k))k=m,m+1,...,n,1 , which is the
conjecture that maximizes player 1 strategic uncertainty. That is, a subject in player 1’s
role with µ11 = µ¯
1 would be indi↵erent among all her strategies at every node of the
game. Consider, again, a CG with n = 3. The prior Threshold Conjecture is defined
as µ¯11 =
 
µ¯11(1), µ¯
1
1(2), µ¯
1
1(3), µ¯
1
1(1)
 
, where µ¯11(1) represents the belief that make player
1 indi↵erent between s1(1) and s1(2).12 The Updated Threshold Conjecture from node 2
perspective is defined as µ¯21 =
 
µ¯21(2), µ¯
2
1(3), µ¯
2
1(1)
 
and the Updated Threshold Conjecture
at node 3 as µ¯31 =
 
µ¯31(3), µ¯
3
1(1)
 
.13 While the subjective conjectures, which are intrinsic to
the decision makers, explain the di↵erences in the observed behavior across subjects playing
the same CG, the Threshold Conjectures are computed from the game payo↵s and can thus
predict di↵erent behavior across CGs.
Remember that Player 2’s p-rationalizable strategies do not depend on p¯ as shown in
Proposition 1. As a result, player 2 data cannot be used to check our theoretical results.
For this reason, we only define both (Updated) Threshold Beliefs and (Updated) Threshold
Conjectures for player 1 and, therefore, in Section 3 we focus our empirical analysis only on
this player role. To simplify the notation, we will leave aside the subscript referring players
role i and substitute it to a subscript that refers to the decision makers.
Now, we clarify the interpretation of our theoretical framework for a CG with n = 3
because the empirical data used in Section 3 presents this length. Consider a subject i
12Appendix A shows how we obtain the prior Threshold Conjecture for the McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1992)
exponentially increasing sum Centipede Game, with n = 3.
13Note that as the game unfolds the (Updated) Threshold Conjecture decreases by n, as in the case of
subjective (updated) conjectures
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(a) CGA (b) CGB
Figure 2: Di↵erent CGs with Di↵erent Prior Threshold Conjectures
who has a prior conjecture denoted by µ1i =
 
µ1i (1), µ
1
i (2), µ
1
i (3), µ
1
i (1)
 
. As mentioned
above, each (Updated) Threshold Conjecture µ¯m represents the beliefs that make player
1 indi↵erent at node m between choose any of the available strategies. Focusing on the
first decision node, if µ1i (1)   µ¯1(1) Take First belongs to the set of best-replies for a
given subjective belief, while for µ1i (1) < µ¯
1(1) Take First does not belong to the set of
best-replies. That is, if the individual believes that her opponent would choose Take in
her first node with a higher probability than the prior Threshold Belief of the CG, Take
First belongs to the set of player 1’s best-replies. Therefore, given a distribution of µi(1)
obtained from a sample of di↵erent decision makers, di↵erent CGs with di↵erent µ¯(1) must
imply di↵erent theoretical predictions.
Example 2.1. Consider that subject i with µ1i (1) = 0.75. That is, this subject believes that
her opponent play down in her first decision node, i.e. chooses Take First, with a probability
equal to 0.75. There are two possibilities: (i) the subjective prior belief is lower than the
prior Threshold Belief µ¯1(1) and (ii) the subjective prior belief is higher or equal than the
prior Threshold Belief µ¯1(1). Consider the games shown in Figure 2, CGA and CGB, with
µ¯1(1) = 0.8571 and µ¯1(1) = 0.05, respectively. Since µ1i (1) = 0.75 < µ¯
1(1) = 0.857 in CGA,
the best response set contains all possible strategies except Take First while in the CGB,
where µ1i (1) > µ¯
1(1), Take First is the only best response. So, the theoretical predictions
under our methodology are any strategy except Take First in the first CG and Take First
in the second CG. In a pool of subjects, with di↵erent subjective beliefs, playing CGA and
CGB we expect more people choosing Take First in the latter game than in the former. In
other words, if this Threshold Belief is very high, many di↵erent players would have their
subjective beliefs below it and Take First would not belongs to the best-replies sets of their
observing, then, higher cooperation rates.
The example above shows how di↵erent (Updated) Threshold Beliefs imply di↵erent
theoretical predictions. In particular, they may predict why di↵erent people behave hetero-
geneously in the same CG and why same people act di↵erent across modified versions of
the CG. CGA and CGB correspond to CG1 and CG5 of the data used in Section 3 with
an observed Take First frequencies equal to 3.95% and 65.79%, respectively, corroborating
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the prediction of the proposed theory.
For players who do not Take First, the decision of Take Second or not would follow the
same reasoning as in the Example 2.1. But, instead of analyse µ¯1(1) and her subjective
belief µ1i (1), the individual must take into account the Updated Threshold Belief µ¯
2(2)
compared with her subjective updated belief µ2i (2). The same applies for the third, and
last, decision node. Thus, contingent upon the structure of (Updated) Threshold Beliefs of
every game the predicted strategies may vary across CGs with di↵erent payo↵s structures.
This is the relationship we explore empirically in the section below.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we apply the proposed theoretical methodology to experimental data. We
present the data and then analyse the relationship between Threshold Conjectures and
observed behavior at both the population and the individual level.
3.1 Data
The data used come from Garcia-Pola, Iriberri and Kova´rˇ´ık (2020) where the authors pro-
pose 16 di↵erent CGs with n = 3, presented in Appendix D, with a large variety in the
payo↵ structure. Authors classify the games according to some characteristics. First, half
of the games start with unequal splits while the rest games have perfect equality in the very
first node. Second, the evolution of the sum of players’ payo↵s in each terminal node can be
di↵erentiated in four groups: increasing-sum, constant-sum, decreasing-sum and variable-
sum.14 The participants in the experiment decide, using reduce-form strategies, in the 16
di↵erent CGs via strategic-method and without feedback between games to reduce as much
as possible learning and reputation concerns. As we show above, the (Updated) Threshold
Conjectures of a CG depend on the payo↵s structures. Therefore, thanks to the payo↵
di↵erences across the 16 CGs, we obtain a variety of (Updated) Threshold Conjectures’
structures, which we exploit in the next section. Table 1a lists the corresponding prior
Threshold Conjecture µ¯1 of each CG and Figure 6 in Appendix E illustrates their evolution
graphically.15 Note that, accordingly with the evolution of prior Threshold Conjectures,
there is no common trend among all games, but we can roughly classify them as increasing,
decreasing, V-shaped and Threshold Conjectures with no specific evolution.
Table 1b displays the observed relative frequencies of each strategy played by decision
makers in the role of player 1 (P1, henceforth) for each of the 16 CGs. We can highlight
that the modal choices vary between groups of games. For increasing-sum games, the modal
14Games from 1 to 8 are classified as increasing-sum, games 9 and 10 as constant-sum, games 11 and 12
as decreasing-sum and the rest as variable-sum
15Table 6 in Appendix C displays the Updated Threshold Beliefs from node 2 and 3 perspective.
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choices are more concentrated around Take Second and Take Third, except for CG 5 and 6
where the most frequent choice is Take First with a relative frequencies higher than 50%.
While in decreasing-sum games the modal strategy is Take First. In the constant-sum
games the most frequent election is Take Second and, finally, for variable-sum games there
is no a common pattern but the Take First is the modal choice for almost all the games.
CG µ¯1(1) µ¯1(2) µ¯1(3) µ¯1(1)
1 85.71 12.24 1.75 0.29
2 93.18 6.01 0.73 0.08
3 80.00 10.00 3.64 6.36
4 90.91 4.46 1.08 3.55
5 5.00 5.94 19.08 69.98
6 11.76 16.54 32.26 39.43
7 96.15 3.21 0.53 0.11
8 65.91 11.36 18.18 4.55
9 63.64 7.06 2.65 26.65
10 66.67 15.00 1.47 16.87
11 33.33 9.52 5.19 51.95
12 37.50 5.21 6.03 51.26
13 12.50 40.00 15.83 31.67
14 28.57 31.43 13.75 26.25
15 14.29 7.79 3.32 74.61
16 75.00 1.32 0.95 22.74
(a) Prior Threshold Conjectures
CG s(1) s(2) s(3) s(1)
1 3.95 32.89 40.79 22.37
2 2.63 34.21 31.58 31.58
3 15.79 57.89 18.42 7.89
4 9.21 64.47 21.05 5.26
5 65.79 14.47 13.16 6.58
6 51.32 15.79 19.74 13.16
7 15.79 21.05 25.00 38.16
8 53.95 21.05 14.47 10.53
9 22.37 59.21 11.84 6.58
10 11.84 67.11 15.79 5.26
11 64.47 10.53 15.79 9.21
12 55.26 32.89 7.89 3.95
13 50.00 17.11 22.37 10.53
14 31.58 39.47 15.79 13.16
15 72.37 10.53 14.47 2.63
16 39.47 40.79 10.53 9.21
(b) Relative Frequencies
Table 1: Data across CGs, Player 1
3.2 Results
This section reviews, first, whether there is the predicted negative relationship between the
Threshold Conjectures and the observed strategies. Then, we provide various evaluations
of how our theoretical result can explain the observational data. To this purpose, we apply
di↵erent techniques to check by how much our methodology explicate the observed behavior
at the population and the individual level.
Table 2 shows the correlations between the dummy variables for each strategy and the
corresponding potentially (Updated) Threshold Conjectures.16 The diagonal elements of
the table support the intuition presented in Section 2.3. At each decision node, the higher
the Threshold Belief –µ¯1(1), µ¯2(2), µ¯3(3)– the lower the likelihood to choose Take and,
consequently, the lower the observed frequencies of Take in that node. Moreover, although
the magnitude of the estimated correlation coe cients decrease as the game unfolds, all the
16The correlations are computed using only the behavior of subjects who reach the corresponding node in
the corresponding game for m > 1.
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diagonal elements are significant at 1% significance level. Finally, we can remark the similar
structure of correlations between each strategy and its Threshold Conjecture starting with
the highest negative value that end up being positive as the Threshold Belief is further away
from the decision node. In Section 4 we delve into the significant correlations between the
strategies and the future Threshold Beliefs when we present avenues for future research.
µ¯1 First µ¯2 Second µ¯3 Third µ¯3 Pass
µ¯1(1) -0.4036***
µ¯1(2) 0.0516** µ¯2(2) -0.1742***
µ¯1(3) 0.2564*** µ¯2(3) -0.1116*** µ¯3(3) -0.1491***
µ¯1(1) 0.4140*** µ¯2(1) 0.2066*** µ¯3(1) 0.1491*** µ¯3(1) -0.1491***
Note: ⇤p < 0.10; ⇤⇤p < 0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p < 0.01
Table 2: Correlation Between (Updated) Threshold Beliefs and Behavior
To provide a more formal econometric analysis, we estimate logit models of each binary
decision on the corresponding Threshold Belief, i.e. µ¯m(m)m=1,2,3. Table 3 in Appendix C
presents the estimation results. Since the estimations corroborate the results in Table 2, we
only include in the main text Figure 3 that visualizes the estimated probabilities of each
strategy for changes in the contemporaneous Threshold Beliefs.
Figure 2 delivers the following observations. First, roughly 70% of the subjects would
take at each decision node if the (Updated) Threshold Belief is 0, that is, if the Threshold
Belief that player 2 would choose Take in the following decision node is 0. Following
the interpretation shown, all subjects would present a subjective belief higher than the
Threshold Belief, i.e. µ1i (1)   µ¯1 for all subjects, and then Take would be the unique best-
response. Consequently, we can expect higher rates of Take in this case. If all subjects in
the pool act following our proposed methodology, we could expect a predicted probability
of Take equal to 100%.
Second, the sensitivity of the predicted probabilities to changes in Threshold Beliefs
decreases as the game progresses. This is reflected in the slope of the predicted probability
curve that becomes flatter as we move from Figure 3a to 3c. So, the subjects in the later
decision nodes are less sensitive to changes in the Threshold Beliefs. In this line, mention
that the average marginal e↵ects of the explanatory variables in each model decreases by
50%, for the estimated logit models for Take First and Take Third, respectively. Note that,
since the actions in the third node, Take Third and Pass Always are complementary, the
estimated models, as well as the probabilities derived from them, are symmetric in Figure
3 and Table 2.
Last, the predicted probability to Take at each node in the hypothetical case of a (Up-
dated) Threshold Belief equal to 100, in percentages, increase at later stages. As indicated
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by our methodology, if an (Updated) Threshold Belief would at some decision node be 100,
nobody should play Take in this node. However, the estimated percentage in such a case
is 15%, somehow higher than 0%, for the first node and increases up to 50% in the third
node. This indicates that our methodology would explain worse the observed behavior in
advanced nodes of the game.
(a) Take First (b) Take Second
(c) Take Third (d) Pass Always
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Strategies from Changes in its SizeBAP
All the results presented so far corroborate that the (Updated) Threshold Belief are
significant predictors of the behavior.In the following, we quantify to what extent our
methodology explains the observed behavior.As a first step, we evaluate to what extent
our estimated logit models predict the observed individual choices. We define a correct
estimation if, at the individual level, two conditions hold: (i) an estimated model predicts
that a subject takes a particular action in a particular decision node with a probability
higher than 50% and (ii) the observed decision is this particular action. The precision of
the estimated models are 16.94%, 28.21% and 18.67% for Take First, Take Second and Take
Third, respectively.
Previous literature (see Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross, 1996; Costa-Gomes, Craw-
ford and Broseta, 2001; Garcia-Pola, Iriberri and Kova´rˇ´ık,2020; among many others) shows
that individuals cannot be classified in an homogeneous decision making process. If that is
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so, we cannot expect that all subjects act following our belief-based approach. Therefore,
we assess that Threshold Conjectures predict significantly the behavior of a subject if the
prior Threshold Belief a↵ects the observed behavior at less 10% significance for the esti-
mated logit model in the first decision node. To do so, we estimate individually the logit
model regressing the dummy for Take First on the prior Threshold Belief µ¯1(1) using the 16
decisions made by each individual. We carry out the classification procedure using the first
decision node where there is a clearer relationship between the decision to enter the game
or not and the prior Threshold Belief. We obtain that for 43, out of the total 71, subjects
the e↵ect is significant at 10% confidence level.17 Precisely, for 26.76% of the subjects the
p-value is equal or less than 1%, for 47.89% is equal or less than 5% and for 60.56% the sig-
nificance level is less or equal than 10%.18 Thereupon, our novel belief-based approach can
explain significantly the di↵erences across both subjects and CGs and, additionally, there
are evidences that an important part of the decision makers may follow this methodology.
4 Conclusions and Future Research
In this study, we show that cooperation in CGs does not have to be puzzling. We theoret-
ically present that cooperation in such games can be explained with a minimum suspicion
about CBR. We further propose a novel general subjective belief-based approach that links
p-rationalizability with the payo↵s structure of CGs. We find that Threshold Conjectures,
which induce indi↵erence between possible strategies, serve as predictors of cooperation.
Our methodology can explain the intra-subjects heterogeneity behavior, as a consequence
of changes in the Threshold Beliefs of the CGs, and the between-subjects heterogeneity
behavior, as a consequence of changes in the subjective beliefs. The reported results in
this paper exhibit a well explanation of the lab data at both the population level and the
individual level.
In the following, we outline three avenues for future research.
Design new CGs. In Section 3 we use CGs from Garcia-Pola, Iriberri and Kova´rˇ´ık (2020)
which are designed for a di↵erent purpose purpose. There, these games were not designed
to test our methodology. In order to test our theory further, we should design a set of
alternative CGs, to exploit the ability of Threshold Conjectures to target causality, that
systematically manipulate the magnitude and the evolution of the Threshold Conjectures.
Forward Looking. The framework presented in this paper explains the behavior in a
17There are 5 subjects who had never chose Take First so there is no estimated model for them.
18Table 10 in Appendix C displays both the cumulative and the cumulative relative frequencies for some
ranks of p-values
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particular node solely in function of the Threshold Belief in this node and disregards the
Threshold Belief in later decision nodes. However, Table 2 and Table 5 in Appendix B show
that all the future Threshold Beliefs, at every decision node, are strong predictors of the
cooperation rates suggesting some king of Forward Lookingness. Future research should pro-
pose a theory linking the behavior in a particular node to payo↵s in later stages of the game.
Strategy Uncertainty. Recent literature emphasizes in the ability of strategic uncer-
tainty to organize the observed behavior in games that reflect the tension between payo↵
maximization and sequential rationality. Mostly of the papers applies the Basin of Attrac-
tion notion to the prisoners dilemma (Embrey, Fre´chette and Yuksel, 2018; Dal Bo´ and
Fre´chette, 2011) but also to the CG (Healy, 2017). We can show that the first element of
µ¯m at each decision node, i.e. µ¯m(m)m=1,2,3 for the case of CGs with n = 3, coincides with
the size of the Basin of Attraction to Pass, which is the size of the set of beliefs such that
cooperation is appealing. Therefore, their approach seems to be a subset of our more gen-
eral methodology. As a result, further research should establish a more formal connection
between our approach and this literature and between CGs and the games analysed in the
above cited studies.
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A Computing the prior Threshold Conjecture
To obtain the prior Threshold Conjecture of P1, µ¯1, for the McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1992)
exponentially increasing sum CG we proceed backwards. At each decision node we make
indi↵erent P1 between Take and any future strategy. Note that whenever necessary beliefs
are updated via bayesian rule.
1 2 1 2 1 2
40
10
20
80
160
40
80
320
640
160
320
1280
2560
640
r r r r r r
d d d d d d
Figure 4: Exponentially increasing sum Centipede Game
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
640 = 320 µ¯1(3)µ¯1(3)+µ¯1(1) + 2560
µ¯1(1)
µ¯1(3)+µ¯1(1)
160 = 80 µ¯1(2)µ¯1(2)+µ¯1(3)+µ¯1(1) + 320
µ¯1(3)
µ¯1(2)+µ¯1(3)+µ¯1(1) + 2560
µ¯1(1)
µ¯1(2)+µ¯1(3)+µ¯1(1)
40 = 20
µ¯1(1)
µ¯1(1) + µ¯1(2) + µ¯1(3) + µ¯1(1) + 80
µ¯1(2)
µ¯1(1) + µ¯1(2) + µ¯1(3) + µ¯1(1)+
320
µ¯1(3)
µ¯1(1) + µ¯1(2) + µ¯1(3) + µ¯1(1) + 2560
µ¯1(1)
µ¯1(1) + µ¯1(2) + µ¯1(3) + µ¯1(1)
µ¯1(1) + µ¯1(2) + µ¯1(3) + µ¯1(1) = 1
To obtain the equations we proceed as follows:
• First equation. Payo↵ for Take Third equals to the expected payo↵ for any possible
future final histories. That is, payo↵ for P1 when P2 chooses Take Third times the
Threshold Belief µ¯1(3) over the probability to reach node 3 plus the payo↵ for P1
when P2 chooses Pass Always multiplied by the Threshold Belief µ¯1(1) over the
probability to reach node 3.
• Second equation. Payo↵ for Take Second equals to the expected payo↵ for any possible
future final histories. That is, payo↵ for P1 when P2 chooses Take Second times the
Threshold Belief µ¯1(2) over the probability to reach node 2 plus the payo↵ for P1
when P2 chooses Take Third times the Threshold Belief µ¯1(3) over the probability to
reach node 2, and so on.
• Third equation. Same procedure as the other two equations.
• Fourth equation. Restriction to get a full support conjecture.
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B Estimated Models
First Second Third Pass
µ¯(1) -0.0289***
(0.00216)
µ¯2(2) -0.0125***
(0.00258)
µ¯3(3) -0.00935*** 0.00935***
(0.00325) (0.00325)
Constant 0.836*** 0.661*** 0.899*** -0.899***
(0.120) (0.139) (0.200) (0.200)
Observations 1,216 786 376 376
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Estimated Simple Logit Models for each Strategy
First Second Third Pass
µ¯(1) -0.00960** 0.0147*** -0.00171
(0.00457) (0.00469) (0.00499)
µ¯2(2) -0.0363*** 5.37e-05 0.00257
(0.00685) (0.00713) (0.00744)
µ¯3(3) -0.00394 -0.0296*** -0.0104*
(0.00524) (0.00549) (0.00577)
Constant 3.039*** 1.376*** 0.929***
(0.226) (0.237) (0.246)
Observations 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Estimated Simple Multinomial Logit Model
23
First First First Second Second Third
µ¯(1) -0.0430***
(0.00323)
µ¯2(2) -0.0474*** -0.0232***
(0.00415) (0.00410)
µ¯3(3) -0.0201*** -0.0248*** -0.0178***
(0.00285) (0.00346) (0.00633)
Constant 1.936*** 1.337*** 0.409*** 1.801*** 1.755*** 1.813***
(0.187) (0.154) (0.121) (0.250) (0.207) (0.463)
Observations 688 688 688 392 392 140
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Estimated Simple Logit Models, Forward Looking
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C Additional Tables
node 2 node 3
CG µ¯2(2) µ¯2(3) µ¯2(1) µ¯3(3) µ¯3(1)
1 85.71 12.24 2.04 85.71 14.29
2 88.20 10.65 1.16 90.21 9.79
3 50.00 18.18 31.82 36.36 63.64
4 49.09 11.84 39.07 23.26 76.74
5 6.25 20.09 73.66 21.43 78.57
6 18.75 36.56 44.69 45.00 55.00
7 83.33 13.89 2.78 83.33 16.67
8 33.33 53.33 13.33 80.00 20.00
9 19.40 7.30 73.30 9.06 90.94
10 45.00 4.40 50.60 8.00 92.00
11 14.29 7.79 77.92 9.09 90.91
12 8.33 9.65 82.02 10.53 89.47
13 45.71 18.10 36.19 33.33 66.67
14 44.00 19.25 36.75 34.38 65.63
15 9.09 3.87 87.04 4.26 95.74
16 5.26 3.79 90.95 4.00 96.00
Table 6: Updated Threshold Conjectures from node 2 and 3 perspective
First Second Third Pass
µ¯(1) -0.4036* 0.2317* 0.0903* 0.1471*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0000)
µ¯(2) 0.0516 -0.0557 0.0246 -0.0241
(0.0720) (0.0520) (0.3920) (0.4012)
µ¯(3) 0.2564* -0.1960* -0.0356 -0.0489
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2142) (0.0885)
µ¯(1) 0.4140* -0.2087* -0.1157* -0.1652*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
p-values in parentheses. ⇤p < 0.01
Table 7: Correlations between Threshold Beliefs and Strategies
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node 1 node 2 node 3
µ¯(1) µ¯(2) µ¯(3) µ¯2(2) µ¯2(3) µ¯3(3)
µ¯(1) 1.0000 µ¯(2) 1.0000 µ¯3(3) 1.000
( - ) ( - ) ( - )
µ¯(2) -0.4709 1.0000 µ¯2(3) -0.0026 1.0000 µ¯3(1) -1.0000
(0.0000) ( - ) (0.9284) ( - ) (0.000)
µ¯(3) -0.6829 0.4586 1.0000 µ¯2(1) -0.9109 -0.4103
(0.0000) (0.0000) ( - ) (0.0000) (0.0000)
µ¯(1) -0.8652 0.0320 0.3354
(0.0000) (0.2642) (0.0000)
Note: p-value between brackets
Table 8: Correlation between (Updated) Threshold Beliefs
µ¯(1) µ¯2(2) µ¯3(3)
µ¯(1) 1.0000
( - )
µ¯2(2) 0.6610 1.0000
(0.0000) ( - )
µ¯3(3) 0.4647 0.7956 1.0000
(0.0000 (0.0000 ( - )
Note: p-value between brackets
Table 9: Correlation between First Element of (Updated) Threshold Conjectures
p-value Cum. Freq Cum. Rel. Freq
 0.005 13 18.31
 0.010 19 26.76
 0.050 34 47.89
 0.100 43 60.56
 0.250 57 80.28
 0.500 59 83.10
 0.750 68 95.77
 1.000 71 100
Table 10: Frequencies of p-value used to Classify Individuals
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D Centipede Games
CG 1 CG 2
CG 3 CG 4
CG 5 CG 6
CG 7 CG 8
CG 9 CG 10
CG 11 CG 12
CG 13 CG 14
CG 15 CG 16
Figure 5: The 16 CGs Used in the Experiment.
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E Additional Plots
Figure 6: Evolution of prior Threshold Conjectures across CGs
28 E Additional Plots
Figure 7: Evolution of Updated Threshold Beliefs across CGs
The Updated Threshold Beliefs plotted in this figure are the Threshold Beliefs that player
2 would play s2(m)m=1,2,3, from each node perspective m. That is, µ¯m1 (m)m=1,2,3, which
correspond to second column of Table 1a and second and fifth columns of Table 6.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Strategy’s Frequencies across CGs
30 E Additional Plots
Figure 9: Evolution of Conditioned Strategy’s Frequencies across CGs
